Does Khamenei need Zarif to advance his dual policy?

Ali Afshari – Radio Farda

The interview of Mohammad Javad Zarif, the Strategic Deputy of the President of Iran, with Fareed Zakaria, the host of CNN, at the 2025 Davos Summit has sparked a new round of conflicts within the power bloc.

Hardliners have been significantly upset by his comments regarding their defeat in the 14th presidential election and the potential for war in the Middle East if Saeed Jalili were to become president, demanding his removal from Masoud Pezeshkian’s government.

Saeed Jalili, in particular, by emphasizing the need for security agencies to intervene, has opened a new dimension to these criticisms. Additionally, limited gatherings have been held in Tehran and Isfahan, accusing the former Foreign Minister of serious charges.

Since Zarif returned to his strategic deputy role under Pezeshkian after his initial resignation, hardliners, including Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, have called for his dismissal due to a conflict with the “Law Prohibiting the Selection or Appointment of Officials and Managers with Dual Nationality or Foreign Ties.” Zarif’s children, born in the U.S., possess dual citizenship. It appears that Pezeshkian, with a green light from Khamenei, has made this appointment.

Pezeshkian has sought clearance from security and intelligence agencies for all his appointments and, as a result, issued the necessary decrees. It seems unlikely that Zarif’s appointment would be an exception. Intelligence agencies, too, have not shown sensitivity towards his governmental role thus far.

Despite all efforts by opponents, Javad Zarif continues his work and sometimes speaks on behalf of the government. He has also organized the “National Consensus” conference. Given this situation and Pezeshkian’s behavior, it seems unlikely that the Iranian President would remove him under pressure.

Khamenei’s remarks at the anniversary of the “Mission of the Prophet of Islam” reinforce the notion that Mohammad Javad Zarif is indeed a representative of the system, and his statements in Davos were made with the Leader’s approval.

In these remarks, Khamenei’s reference to the possibility of negotiating and dealing with those described as “malign” if aware of the realities aligns with Zarif’s statements.

Zarif’s resume, which has a complex relationship with Khamenei and his advancement in the power structure of the Islamic Republic dependent on the Leader’s special support, indicates his belief in an ideological and anti-Western foreign policy.

Zarif sees America as the “Great Satan,” but his difference with hardliners lies in his approach and emphasis on reducing confrontation costs and pragmatism. Although Zarif’s approach relatively aligns less with the foreign policy doctrine based on national interests, ultimately, he is part of the classic Islamic Republic.

Considering Zarif’s statements in Davos, it can be inferred that he tried to present misleading information about Iranian society to Western public opinion and strengthen the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic. He described Iran’s severe authoritarianism as “democracy” and attributed the achievements from the Iranian people’s struggles against compulsory hijab to the “rationality of the system” and “attention to people’s demands.”

Zarif’s positive approach to negotiation does not necessarily mean facilitating an agreement with Trump; rather, it aligns with the system’s “strategic patience” strategy, hoping for the passage of Trump’s second term. His aim was to pressure Western countries into accepting the conditions set by the Islamic Republic.

Reviewing Zarif’s record shows that he places the ideological and value-based perspective of the Islamic Republic over ideals in foreign policy, erroneously concluding that there is no conflict between idealism and national interests. He consistently distorts the realities in Iran, claiming that the Islamic Republic is an “anti-hegemonic” actor, while the Islamic Republic opposes Western hegemony but has no problem with the hegemony of China and Russia and seeks regional hegemony and colonial relations in target countries.

In the logical deadlock resulting from his contradictory approach, Zarif is forced to overlook or downplay the value and ideal aspects of the system in diplomacy. This is the primary reason for the attacks by extremist hardliners and supporters of Khamenei’s autocracy, who see his conservative and pragmatic interpretation of ideal foreign policy as a threat to the system’s transformation.

Khamenei, at this juncture, needs Zarif to advance his dual policy. However, naturally, Zarif’s policy does not align with his strategic vision, but he does not see it as a lasting threat either, and differences in this area are tolerable.

Zarif’s greater focus on pragmatism and attacking his rivals has created issues that might be controlled by the criticisms of internal government critics. However, this situation could develop in a way that disrupts the balance, leading to Zarif’s premature exit from the sphere of official influence in the system, potentially sending him back into retirement.

January 30, 2025 | 5:11 pm